Drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s hypothesis about transcendental geology in the final phase of his work, this article examines the debate about the Anthropocene from the perspective of philosophy of history. Firstly, we follow the author through the preliminary materials for The Visible and The Invisible by situating transcendental geology within the book’s complex theoretical architecture, and by foregrounding the necessity of rethinking the notion of Earth through the reading that the French philosopher offers of Husserl’s phenomenology. We will thus focus on (...) the theme of the overturning of the Copernican doctrine in an ethico-practical perspective, showing that Merleau-Ponty’s ecology can be considered a philosophical ecology ante litteram. Finally, drawing on the hypothesis proposed by historians Bonneuil and Fressoz, the essay will attempt to highlight the relevance of Merleau-Ponty’s practical thought for the debate about the Anthropocene. (shrink)

El objetivo de este artículo es hacer una reconstrucción racional del uso del examen de proporcionalidad en contextos de adjudicación judicial de derechos sociales constitucionales. Dicho trabajo de reconstrucción será desarrollado en dos pasos. En primer lugar, se tratará el interrogante referido a si el examen de proporcionalidad en su variante “por omisión” exhibe o no una estructura diferente con respecto a su, mucho más conocida e investigada, variante “por exceso”. En segundo lugar, se describirán las reglas y formas de (...) argumentación que están implícitas en el uso del examen de proporcionalidad por omisión y que componen a sus respectivos sub-exámenes de idoneidad, necesidad y proporcionalidad stricto sensu. Por último, se presentará un breve resumen a modo de conclusión. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to make a rational reconstruction of the use of the proportionality test in contexts of judicial adjudication of constitutional social rights. This reconstruction will be developed in two stages. Firstly, I will deal with the question of whether the proportionality test in its variation by omission (that is, in cases of positive rights) exhibits or not a different structure with respect to its (better known and developed) variation by excess (that is, in cases of (...) negative rights). Secondly, I will describe the rules and forms of argumentation implied in the use of the proportionality test by omission, which constitute its respective sub-tests of suitability, necessity and proportionality stricto sensu. Lastly, I will present a brief summary. (shrink)

It is precisely through movement that the subject inscribes itself into the world and becomes visible to others. The subject is a movement directed to the outside, that is to say, the subject is desire. Desire is the “tension” toward the “extrême dehors” that we call the world. In all of his works Maurice Merleau-Ponty reaffirms, without thematizing it, a conception of life as movement, and of body as action and desire: the human being is “a certain lack of....” In (...) other words, it is the distance between myself and the absent that drives me to move, to annul the distance through motion. Thus life is nothing but the unfinished act of moving into space and thereby creating space—the space in which we, as desire and movement, encounter both others and the world. As the act of moving is the way one appears to another, every relationship is based on appearing. In short, life is the movement that leads us towards the world and coincides with our desire to make it appear.C’est précisément par le mouvement que le sujet s’inscrit dans le monde et devient visible pour les autrui. Le sujet est un mouvement dirigé au dehors, c’est-à-dire, le sujet est désir. Le désir est la « tension » vers le « dehors extrême » que nous appelons le monde. Partout, Merleau-Ponty affirme, sans la thématiser explicitement, une conception de la vie comme mouvement, et une conception du corps comme action et désir : l’homme est « un certain manque de ». En d’autres termes, c’est la distance entre moi-même et l’absente qui me force à bouger, à annuler la distance à partir du mouvement. Donc la vie n’est rien que l’acte inachevé de bouger dans l’espace et par là la création de l’espace – l’espace dans lequel nous, comme désir et mouvement, rencontrons les autrui et le monde. Comme l’action est le moyen par lequel l’un apparait à l’autre, tous les rapports sont basés sur l’apparence. En bref, la vie est le mouvement qui nous amène vers le monde et qui coïncide avec notre désir de le faire apparaître.È attraverso il movimento che il soggetto si iscrive nel mondo e diviene visibile per l’altro. Il soggetto è un movimento in direzione del “fuori”, il che significa che il soggetto è desiderio. Il desiderio è “tensione” verso quell’“estremo fuori” che chiamiamo mondo. Ovunque Merleau-Ponty riafferma, senza tematizzarlo esplicitamente, una concezione della vita come movimento, e una concezione del corpo come azione e desiderio: l’uomo è “una certa mancanza di”. In altri termini, è la distanza tra me e l’assente che mi forza a muovermi, ad annullare la distanza tramite il movimento. Dunque la vita non è che l’atto incompiuto di questo muoversi nello spazio e di questo creare lo spazio – lo spazio nel quale noi come desiderio e movimento incontriamo gli altri e il mondo. E poiché l’azione è il mezzo attraverso cui l’uno appare all’altro, tutti i rapporti sono basati sull’apparenza, e la vita è il movimento che ci conduce verso il mondo e che coincide col nostro desiderio di farlo apparire. (shrink)

Dans cette contribution nous analysons l’interprétation de Merleau-Ponty du schéma corporel et du mouvement, en relation avec les découvertes récentes en neurosciences cognitives, afin de proposer une esquisse d’une phénoménologie du politique. Plus précisément, nous nous focaliserons, d’une part, sur le concept dynamique de schéma corporel chez Merleau-Ponty et sur sa compréhension de l’intentionnalité motrice et corporelle, ainsi que sur l’image du miroir qu’il utilise souvent, notamment dans la « Note sur Machiavel », et, d’autre part, sur la théorie des (...) neurones miroirs proposée par le neurophysiologiste Giacomo Rizzolatti sur la compréhension de la compréhension. C’est précisément la figure du miroir, et les théories pertinentes sur le réflexe et les réflexions, qui constituent la clé pour relier les études phénoménologiques du corps, du mouvement et de l’empathie avec les approches neuroscientifiques sur ces mêmes questions. Le concept de miroir se révèle comme essentiel afin de comprendre le fonctionnement des neurones miroirs ainsi que la base de l’empathie, qui doit être comprise comme compréhension et imitation incarnées. L’autre se révèle comme notre miroir. Nous fournissons ainsi, suivant à la fois les théories phénoménologiques et neuroscientifiques, la preuve qu’il existe effectivement une connexion entre phénoménologie et pensée politique, ainsi qu’une communication inter-corporelle entre moi et autrui, qui peut servir de base pour développer une théorie de l’intersubjectivité en tant qu’intentionnalité corporelle partagée, voire une introduction à une phénoménologie politique. (shrink)

Cet article prend comme point de départ de sa réflexion les défis de l’éducation dans un « univers problématique », tel qu’il est analysé par Ricœur dans un entretien accordé à Anita Hocquard en 1985. Le caractère éminemment conflictuel de la tâche éducative nous amène à discuter les notions de traditionalité, de traditions et de tradition. Il s’agit, ainsi, de réfléchir autour de la lutte pour la reconnaissance, la légitimité et l’autorité des différentes traditions dans un contexte culturel où l’héritage (...) colonialiste s’est imposé comme le modèle qui délégitime les traditions plurielles qui coexistaient et rivalisaient avec cet héritage. Enfin, nous émettons l’hypothèse que la littérature représente une manière alternative de revitaliser ces héritages silencieux, sur la base d’une brève analyse du roman L’histoire de Poncia, de l’écrivaine brésilienne Conceição Evaristo. (shrink)

Far from being haphazard, Merleau-Ponty’s 1945 essay on cinema and 1953 notes on cinema for the lectures at the Collège de France are a precursor of a genuine phenomenology of cinema. Accordingly, in this paper I shall demonstrate that a phenomenology of movement and space tacitly appears in films, since cinema is the art of motion on screen and therefore the art of intersubjectivity par excellence. Moreover, I show that Merleau-Ponty’s ontological conception of the chiasm between the visible and the (...) invisible resembles the interlacing of the “two spaces” mentioned by Noël Burch. Likewise, the interpretation of the world as the “something else” that is simultaneously present and absent in every appearance corresponds, in cinema, to Alain Bergala’s “présence in absentia” of the off-screen on the screen – i.e., to the opening up of off-screen space by means of eyeline match and characters exiting and entering the frame. I finally claim that the use both of long take and depth of field, as analysed by film theorist André Bazin, and of specific camera movements, as analysed by neuroscientist Vittorio Gallese, preserves the continuity of reality and give the impression that the film is a perceptual experience that happens within reality’s space-time continuum.Loin d’être incohérent, l’essai de 1945 de Merleau-Ponty sur le cinéma et ses notes sur le cinéma pour son cours au Collège de France en 1953 sont les précurseurs d’une vraie phénoménologie du cinéma. Dans ce texte, je démontre qu’une phénoménologie du mouvement et de l’espace apparaît tacitement dans les films puisque le cinéma est l’art du mouvement à l’écran et par conséquent l’art de l’intersubjectivité par excellence. Par ailleurs, je montre que la conception ontologique de Merleau-Ponty du chiasme entre le visible et l’invisible ressemble à l’entrelacement des « deux espaces » mentionnés par Noël Burch. De même, l’interprétation du monde comme le « quelque chose d’autre » simultanément présent et absent dans toute apparition correspond, au cinéma à la « présence in absentia » du hors champ dans le champ d’Alain Bergala – à savoir l’ouverture de l’espace du hors champ par la technique du eyeline match et des personnages qui entrent et sortent du cadre. Je soutiens enfin que l’usage à la fois du plan long et de la profondeur de champ, analysés par le théoricien du cinéma André Bazin, ainsi que de mouvements spécifiques de caméra, analysés par le neuroscientifique Vittorio Gallese, préserve la continuité de la réalité et donne l’impression que le film est une expérience perceptive qui se produit à l’intérieur du continuum de l’espace temps de la réalité.Lungi dall’essere interventi estemporanei, i saggi di Merleau-Ponty sul cinema del 1945 e le sue note sul cinema per il corso al Collège de France del 1953 sono precursori di un’autentica fenomenologia del cinema. In questo articolo intendo mostrare come nei film si delinei tacitamente una fenomenologia del movimento e dello spazio, poiché il cinema è l’arte del movimento sullo schermo e per eccellenza l’arte dell’intersoggettività. Inoltre, intendo mettere in luce come la concezione ontologica merleau-pontyana del chiasma di visibile e invisibile si accosti all’intreccio dei “due spazi” menzionati da Noël Burch. In modo analogo, considererò l’interpretazione del mondo come il “qualcos’altro” che è al contempo presente e assente in ogni apparizione come corrispondente, nel cinema, a quella che Alain Bergala definisce la presenza “in absentia” del fuori campo sullo schermo, ossia all’apertura dello spazio fuori campo per mezzo del raccordo sullo sguardo e dell’ingresso e dell’uscita dei personaggi rispetto all’inquadratura. Infine, sosterrò che tanto l’impiego del long take e della profondità di campo, descritti dal teorico del cinema André Bazin, quanto l’uso di specifici movimenti di macchina, analizzati dal neuroscienziato Vittorio Gallese, preservino la continuità del reale e forniscano l’impressione che il film sia un’esperienza percettiva che si svolge entro il continuum spazio-temporale della realtà. (shrink)

Beginning with the relation between the question of Nature and the status of philosophy, this essay interprets the theme of the mirror through the chiasm between multiplicity and thought. This relation is not substantial dualism’s relation of the subject with the object, but rather, following the image used by Merleau-Ponty, it is like the relation between two mirrors facing each other, thus suggesting that the “subject” herself is a multiplicity. From thence, drawing inspiration from this quote in Eye and Mind, (...) “the Cartesian does not see himself in the mirror”, I formulate both the problem of the body and the question of intersubjectivity as a field of individuation for all possible forms of subjectivity. Following this theme, the essay retraces the use of the mirror in the Note on Machiavelli. Finally, given that the theme of subjectivity as a multiplicity is related to the theme of corporeality, the essay ends with an analysis of the idea of the body-mirror which, from an intersubjective point of view, becomes an expressive relation in which each body is mirror and expression of the whole universe, thus unlocking an existential monadology. (shrink)

La teoría del derecho de Robert Alexy. Análisis y crítica es un libro escrito por el profesor Jan-R. Sieckmann, de la Universidad Friedrich-Alexander de Erlangen-Nürnberg, y publicado en la prestigiosa serie de teoría jurídica y filosofía del derecho de la editorial Universidad Externado de Colombia. El libro sistematiza un conjunto de trabajos que tratan sobre la conocida teoría del derecho...

Este trabajo busca responder al siguiente interrogante: ¿es posible resolver confl ictos entre normas constitucionales que disponen derechos fundamentales sin necesidad de ponderar? Para ello expondremos la teoría que, para los casos de confl ictos constitucionales de derechos, propone reconstruir sistemas normativos. Esta teoría está representada en los trabajos de Moreso, Mendonca y Martínez Zorrilla y se presenta como una alternativa a la ponderación. Concluiremos que, si bien esta teoría puede resultar un buen complemento a la hora de formalizar las (...) decisiones judiciales sobre asuntos constitucionales, no puede reemplazar de plano a la ponderación, pues ésta siempre subyacería latente. Ello puede vislumbrarse con claridad en los casos donde derechos sociales fundamentales pretenden validez, en cuyo contexto la ponderación se presenta como algo conceptualmente necesario. (shrink)

'This book is a masterpiece of theoretical thought. It anticipates the actual achievements of much of what we now call sociolinguistics.

Things and Their Place in Theories Our talk of external things, our very notion of things, is just a conceptual apparatus that helps us to foresee and ...

This paper offers a logico-algebraic investigation of AGM belief revision based on the logic of paradox ( \(\mathrm {LP}\) ). First, we define a concrete belief revision operator for \(\mathrm {LP}\), proving that it satisfies a generalised version of the traditional AGM postulates. Moreover, we investigate to what extent the Levi and Harper identities, in their classical formulation, can be applied to a paraconsistent account of revision. We show that a generalised Levi-type identity still yields paraconsistent-based revisions that are fully (...) compatible with the AGM postulates. The main outcome is that, once the classical AGM framework is lifted up to an appropriate level of generality, it still appears as a regulative ideal for treating of paraconsistent-based epistemic operators. (shrink)

DNA helicases are a class of molecular motors that catalyze processive unwinding of double stranded DNA. In spite of much study, we know relatively little about the mechanisms by which these enzymes carry out the function for which they are named. Most current views are based on inferences from crystal structures. A prominent view is that the canonical ATPase motor exerts a force on the ssDNA resulting in “pulling” the duplex across a “pin” or “wedge” in the enzyme leading to (...) a mechanical separation of the two DNA strands. In such models, DNA base pair separation is tightly coupled to ssDNA translocation of the motors. However, recent studies of the Escherichia coli RecBCD helicase suggest an alternative model in which DNA base pair melting and ssDNA translocation occur separately. In this view, the enzyme‐DNA binding free energy is used to melt multiple DNA base pairs in an ATP‐independent manner, followed by ATP‐dependent translocation of the canonical motors along the newly formed ssDNA tracks. Repetition of these two steps results in processive DNA unwinding. We summarize recent evidence suggesting this mechanism for RecBCD helicase action. (shrink)

El objetivo del presente estudio fue analizar las propiedades psicométricas de la ENCAO en trabajadores de una empresa privada del sector de hidrocarburos en Lima Metropolitana. Para esto, se evaluó a una muestra de 384 participantes, 64 % mujeres y 36 % hombres, con edades entre los 19 y los 56 años. Como evidencias de validez de la estructura interna del instrumento, se realizó un análisis factorial exploratorio y un análisis factorial confirmatorio, donde se encontró una estructra de cuatro factores (...) relacionados con los 21 ítems de la escala, los cuales explicaron el 60.33 % de la varianza total y obtuvieron adecuados índices de bondad de ajuste. Como fuente de validez externa se obtuvieron correlaciones moderadas con la variable satisfacción laboral. Los coeficientes alfa de Cronbach de los cuatro factores oscilaron entre.60 y.84. Se concluye que la ENCAO y sus puntuaciones derivadas son una medida válida y fiable para medir el aprendizaje organizacional en el sector laboral evaluado.Palabras clave: aprendizaje organizacional; validez; confiabilidad; análisis factorial. Psychometric properties of the Organizational-Learning Levels and Conditions Scale in employees of a Peruvian private companyThe objective of the present study was to analyze the psychometric properties of the ENCAO in employees of a private company of the hydrocarbon sector in Metropolitan Lima. A sample of 384 participants was evaluated, of whom 64 % were women and 36% men, aged between 19 and 56 years. As evidences of validity related to the internal structure, an exploratory factorial analysis and a confirmatory factorial analysis were carried out, resulting in a structure of four related factors with the 21 items on the scale that explained 60.33 % of the total variance and with adequate goodness of fit indexes. As a source of external validity, moderate correlations were obtained with the variable Job Satisfaction. The Cronbach alpha coefficients of the four factors obtained ranged between.60 and.84. It is concluded that the ENCAO and its derived scores are a valid and reliable measure to measure organizational learning in the evaluated labor sector.Key words: organizational learning; validity; reliability; factorial analysis. Propriedades psicométricas da Escala de Níveis e Condições de Aprendizagem Organizacional em trabalhadores de uma empresa privada peruanaResumoO objetivo do presente estudo foi analisar as propriedades psicométricas da ENCAO em trabalhadores de uma empresa privada do setor de hidrocarbonetos na região metropolitana de Lima, no Peru. Para isso, avaliou-se uma amostra de 384 participantes, 64 % mulheres e 36 % homens, com idades compreendidas entre 19 e 56 anos. Como evidências de validade relacionada à estrutura interna, realizou-se uma análise fatorial exploratória e uma análise fatorial confirmatória com as quais foi encontrada uma estrutura de quatro fatores relacionados com os 21 itens da escala, os quais explicaram o 60.33 % da variância total e obtiveram adequados índices de bondade de ajuste. Como fonte de validade externa foram obtidas correlações moderadas com a variável satisfação laboral. Os coeficientes alfa de Cronbach dos quatro fatores oscilaram entre.60 e.84. Conclui-se que a ENCAO e suas pontuações derivadas são uma medida válida e fiável para medir a aprendizagem organizacional no setor laboral avaliado.Palavras-chave: aprendizagem organizacional; validade; confiabilidade; análise fatorial. (shrink)

Paraorthomodular posets are bounded partially ordered sets with an antitone involution induced by quantum structures arising from the logico-algebraic approach to quantum mechanics. The aim of the present work is starting a systematic inquiry into paraorthomodular posets theory both from algebraic and order-theoretic perspectives. On the one hand, we show that paraorthomodular posets are amenable of an algebraic treatment by means of a smooth representation in terms of bounded directoids with antitone involution. On the other, we investigate their order-theoretical features (...) in terms of forbidden configurations. Moreover, sufficient and necessary conditions characterizing bounded posets with an antitone involution whose Dedekind–MacNeille completion is paraorthomodular are provided. (shrink)

In this paper we show that several classes of partially ordered structures having paraorthomodular reducts, or whose sections may be regarded as paraorthomodular posets, admit a quite natural notion of implication, that admits a suitable notion of adjointness. Within this framework, we propose a smooth generalization of celebrated Greechie’s theorems on amalgams of finite Boolean algebras to the realm of Kleene lattices.

In this article, cognitivism is understood as the view that the engine of human (individual and collective) action is the intentional, dispositional, or other mental capacities of the brain or the mind. Cognitivism has been criticized for considering the essence of human action to reside in its alleged source in mental processes at the expense of the social surroundings of the action, criticism that has often been inspired by Ludwig Wittgenstein's later philosophy. This article explores the logical extent of the (...) critique of cognitivism, arguing that by positing collectively shared knowledge of criteria as the engine of human action many such critiques themselves display latent cognitivism. (shrink)

In this article, cognitivism is understood as the view that the engine of human action is the intentional, dispositional, or other mental capacities of the brain or the mind. Cognitivism has been criticized for considering the essence of human action to reside in its alleged source in mental processes at the expense of the social surroundings of the action, criticism that has often been inspired by Ludwig Wittgenstein's later philosophy. This article explores the logical extent of the critique of cognitivism, (...) arguing that by positing collectively shared knowledge of criteria as the engine of human action many such critiques themselves display latent cognitivism. (shrink)

Il saggio muove da una ricostruzione storico-concettuale dell’interpretazione merleau-pontyana del manoscritto di Husserl Rovesciamento della dottrina copernicana nell’interpretazione della corrente visione del mondo, con cui Merleau-Ponty è in dialogo sin dalla Fenomenologia della percezione, per ripercorrere gli sviluppi del tema della Terra nell’avanzare della riflessione merleau-pontyana sul corpo-proprio, sull’organismo vivente, sulla dimensione carnale dell’essere. La proposta di un ritorno alla Terra, intesa come Boden irriducibile dell’esperienza, trova infatti il suo risvolto ontologico nell’idea di Spielraum, che già Husserl definiva come “ambito (...) di possibilità”, e che in Merleau-Ponty assume il senso di un margine di gioco sempre aperto nella carne. Boden e Spielraum, non a caso tematizzati da Merleau-Ponty in due corsi paralleli tenuti al Collège de France nell’anno 1959-1960, permettono una rivalutazione del vivente secondo un modello che, contro il riduzionismo meccanicista, privilegi la spontaneità e la contingenza, e aprono allo sviluppo dell’ontologia porosa che il filosofo andrà proponendo negli ultimi anni. Ricostruendo la funzione della riflessione sulla corporeità e sul rapporto del vivente al mondo-ambiente in questa maturazione, si argomenterà che la critica che Merleau-Ponty muove al dualismo empirismo-idealismo trovi nell’idea di Terra un momento chiave, che contribuisce ad orientarla in direzione di una filosofia della carne. Questo passaggio riconfigura la Natura stessa, pensata non già come un originario, ma in quanto ambito di possibilità processuale e transindividuale, come quel quasi-oggetto, come lo definiva, ancora, Husserl, che presenta un’irriducibile resistenza ad un pensiero di sorvolo, proprio in quanto è condizione del pensiero stesso e ancoraggio della vita tutta.This essay begins with a historico-conceptual reconstruction of the Merleau-Pontian interpretation of Husserl’s manuscript, “Foundational Investigations of the Phenomenological Origin of the Spatiality of Nature,” with which Merleau-Ponty is in dialogue from Phenomenology of Perception onward, and revisits the development of the theme of the Earth in the progression of Merleau-Ponty’s reflection on le corps propre, the living organism, and the carnal dimension of being. The proposal for a return to the Earth, taken as irreducible Boden of experience, indeed finds its ontological reverse side in the idea of Spielraum, which Husserl already defined as a “milieu of possibilities,” and which in Merleau-Ponty takes on the sense of a margin of play always open in the flesh. Boden and Spielraum, two notions that Merleau-Ponty does not thematize by chance in the two parallel courses given at the Collège de France over the years 1959-1960, enable a reassessment of the living being according to a model that, against mechanistic reductionism, privileges spontaneity and contingency, and opens to the development of the porous ontology that the philosopher would propose in his final years. Reconstructing the function of reflection on corporeality, and on the relationship of the living being with its milieu in the process, it will be argued that the criticism directed by Merleau-Ponty against the dualism of empiricism-idealism finds in the idea of the Earth a key moment that contributes to orienting him in the direction of a philosophy of the flesh. This passage reconfigures Nature itself, no longer conceived of as an originating, but as a milieu of processual and transindividual possibilities, like that quasi-object, as Husserl again defined it, that presents an irreducible resistance against high-altitude thinking, precisely as the condition of thought itself and the anchorage of all life.Cet essai commence avec une reconstruction historico-conceptuelle de l’interprétation merleau-pontienne du manuscrit de Husserl, Renversement de la doctrine copernicienne, avec lequel Merleau-Ponty est en dialogue depuis la Phénoménologie de la perception, et revisite les développement du thème de la Terre dans la progression de la réflexion merleau-pontienne sur le corps propre, sur l’organisme vivant, sur la dimension charnelle de l’être. La proposition d’un retour à la Terre, prise comme Boden irréductible de l’expérience, trouve en effet son envers ontologique dans l’idée de Spielraum, que Husserl déjà définissait comme « milieu de possibilités » et qui chez Merleau-Ponty prend le sens d’une marge de jeu toujours ouverte dans la chair. Boden et Spielraum, deux notions que Merleau-Ponty ne thématise pas par hasard dans les deux cours parallèles donnés au Collège de France au cours de l’année 1959-1960, permettent une réévaluation du vivant selon un modèle qui, contre le réductionnisme mécaniste, privilégie la spontanéité et la contingence, et ouvrent au développement de l’ontologie poreuse que le philosophe allait proposer dans les dernières années. Reconstruisant la fonction de la réflexion sur la corporéité et sur le rapport du vivant avec son milieu dans ce processus, on argumentera que la critique dirigée par Merleau-Ponty contre le dualisme empirisme-idéalisme trouve dans l’idée de la Terre un moment clé qui contribue à l’orienter en direction d’une philosophie de la chair. Ce passage reconfigure la Nature elle-même, pensée non pas déjà comme un originaire, mais en tant que milieu de possibilités processuelles et transindividuelles, en tant que quasi-objet, comme le définissait, encore, Husserl qui offrait une résistance irréductible contre une pensée de survol, précisément en tant que condition de la pensée elle-même et ancrage de toute la vie. (shrink)

We show that intuitionistic logic is deductively equivalent to Connexive Heyting Logic ($$\textrm{CHL}$$ CHL ), hereby introduced as an example of a strongly connexive logic with an intuitive semantics. We use the reverse algebraisation paradigm: $$\textrm{CHL}$$ CHL is presented as the assertional logic of a point regular variety (whose structure theory is examined in detail) that turns out to be term equivalent to the variety of Heyting algebras. We provide Hilbert-style and Gentzen-style proof systems for $$\textrm{CHL}$$ CHL ; moreover, we (...) suggest a possible computational interpretation of its connexive conditional, and we revisit Kapsner’s idea of superconnexivity. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article aims to show how the originality of Jaeggi’s contribution to recent debates in critical theory clearly emerges if one compares her approach with what in many ways represents its antecedent and constant point of reference: namely, the critical theory of Axel Honneth. This comparison offers a privileged way of grasping the advantages of Jaeggi’s approach with respect to that of Honneth. At the same time, reversing perspective, it permits us to focus on some open problems in Jaeggi’s (...) critical theory, which deserve to be discussed with care. The negativistic, formal and procedural character of her critical theory, while on one hand shielding her approach from the risks to which the most recent theory of Honneth is exposed – historical teleologism and ethical substantialism – on the other hand exposes her approach to the risk of an excess of formalism and proceduralism, rendering it unable to tackle the central problem for any critical theory: namely, the link with a critical praxis and with the struggles for the emancipation of one’s own time. (shrink)

Ocherk 1. Voprosy ontologii -- Ocherk 2. Voprosy ėtiki i ėstetiki -- Ocherk 3. Voprosy gnoseologii i aksiologii.